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EX POST FACTO LAWS
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10:
No State shall ... pass any Bill ofAttainder, ex post
facto Law....
N.Y CONST. art. I, § 9:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Lmv shall be
passed
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Hernandez'
(Decided September 20, 1999)
Defendant, Jose Hemandez, was convicted of sexual abuse in the
first degree and attempted rape in the first degree in County Court,
Nassau County On February 13, 1995, the defendant confronted
a woman outside of her apartment building, "told her that he
wanted to 'make love' to her, that he would kill her if she made a
noise, and then choked her when she cried out."3 She pretended to
lose consciousness while the defendant pulled her to the basement
of the building and fondled her groin area through her clothes.4 As
they reached the door to the basement, the victim escaped into a
neighbor's apartment.5 Responding to the neighbor's telephone
call, the police took the victim and her husband to the hospital.6
' . 695 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1999).
2Id
I People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261, 265, 711 N.E.2d 972, 973,689 N.Y.S.2d
695, 697 (1999) (giving an account of the facts in this case).




Gingher: People v Hernandez
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
After searching the area, the police located the defendant hiding in
shrubbery.7 The victim identified the defendant in police custody
after she returned from the hospital.' The defendant's sentence
included a "certification that defendant was a sex offender
pursuant to"'9 the Sex Offender Registration Act'0 (SORA). The
Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed his conviction,1'
but did not address Hemandez's constitutional claim that his
certification pursuant to the SORA was a violation 2 of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, 13 so Hemandez appealed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the mandatory SORA certification was part of a
defendant's conviction, 4 and was appealable as a mandatory
surcharge."5
7id.
8 People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 265, 711 N.E.2d at 973, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
9 Id. at 266, 711 N.E.2d at 974, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
10 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-v (McKinney 1996). Subsection d (1)
provides in pertinent part: "Upon conviction the court shall certify that the
person is a sex offender and shall include the certification in the order of
commitment. The court shall also advise the sex offender of the duties of this
article." Id. This law is New York's version of Megan's law, see Doe v. Pataki,
120 F.3d 1263, 1266 (2d Cir. 1997). The law became effective on January 21,
1996. N.Y. CoRRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney 1996). It was passed to bring
New York State in compliance with the Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 14071(d) (West 1995) (providing guidelines to State Attorneys General to
establish programs for registration of the current address of persons convicted of
sex crimes against minors).
" People v. Hernandez, 250 A.D.2d 704, 673 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1998).
12 93 N.Y.2d at 266, 711 N.E.2d at 974, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
13 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. This.section provides in pertinent part: "No State
shall.., pass any... ex post facto Law.. .." Id. A statute violating the Ex Post
Facto Clause must inflict criminal punishment retroactively on the actor. Doe v.
Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing the formulation of the term of
art "Ex post facto" from Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 (1925)). The
federal Constitution provides this limitation on the legislatures of the state (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10) and the federal government (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 9);
See also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing in pertinent part: "No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed").
14 93 N.Y.2d at 268, 711 N.E.2d at 975, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (overruling the
holding in People v. Grice, 254 A.D.2d 710, 679 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't
1998)).
'" Id. A statutory mandatory surcharge is an additional fee that is effected when
the defendant is convicted and assessed when the convict is sentenced. Because
592 [Vol 16
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The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division,
Second Department, to review Hernandez's ex post facto challenge
of his sex offender certification pursuant to'6 the SORA." The
Appellate Division held that retroactive application of the SORA
was constitutional 8 as evidenced by the numerous ex post facto
challenges antedating defendant's claim.' 9
The defendant argued on remand to the Appellate Division that
his certification as a sex offender by the sentencing court violated
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws since the
SORA was effective after January 21, 1996, almost a year after the
the SORA certification is finalized on conviction and recorded when sentenced,
it has the same procedural tack. Conviction and sentencing are part of the
judgment, and since the surcharge component is appealable, likewise the Court
of Appeals held the SORA certification should also be appealable. Id
16 695 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
17 93 N.Y.2d at 269-71, 711 N.E.2d at 976-77, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 699-700
(characterizing the Appellate Division's use of People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y.2d
270, 692 N.E.2d 985, 669 N.Y.S.2d 962 as inapt because that case dealt with
retroactive application of the notification and reporting requirements of the
SORA and not the certification provision).
1 695 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
19 See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that application of
the registration and notification provisions to persons committing offenses prior
to the effective date of SORA is constitutional), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1122
(1998); People v. Langdon, 258 A.D.2d 937, 685 N.Y.S.2d 877 (4th Dep't 1999)
(ruling that "retroactive application of SORA to sex offenders convicted prior to
the act's effective date" is constitutional); People v. Griffin, 171 Misc. 2d 145,
652 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that certification of a sex offender as
required by SORA §168-d (1) after conviction but during a stay of execution of
a judgment is ministerial and not punitive, thus constitutional). See also, e.g.,
People v. Grice, 254 A.D.2d 710, 679 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1998) (ruling
that certification as a sex offender, designation of risk level, and "subjection to
notification requirements of SORA are not part of the judgment of conviction,"
and the registration requirement of SORA as a condition of parole does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Matter of S.V. v. Calabrese, 246 A.D.2d 655,
668 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't 1998) (holding that retroactive risk level
determination of a sex offender under the SORA is constitutional); Matter of
M.G. v. Travis, 236 A.D.2d 163, 667 N.Y.S.2d 11 (2d Dep't 1997) (applying
special conditions of parole in accordance with SORA constitutes prevention
and not punishment, therefore is constitutional);
2000 593
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defendant committed his offense." The Appellate Division found
Hernandez's sole contention unpersuasive, noting that many courts
upheld application of the SORA to convicted sex offenders whose
crime was committed before the effective date of the SORA.2"
Most of the reasoning that the cited cases relied upon can be found
in Doe v. Pataki.22
A two part Ex Post Facto Clause test was enunciated in Pataki.
The first determination required examination of the statute to
determine whether the legislature intended to impose criminal
punishment. If the legislature clearly intended the statute to be
punitive, the statute could not be applied retroactively without
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. If the legislature intended not
to impose criminal punishment, then secondly, the challenger
would have to show that the law had an essentially punitive
character in purpose or effect, contrary to legislative intent.'
In the preamble of the SORA, "the legislature articulated two
goals: (1) protecting members of the community, particularly their
children, by notifying them of the presence of individuals in their
midst who may present a danger, and (2) enhancing law
enforcement authorities' ability to investigate and prosecute future
sex crimes. ' 4 The SORA established a Board' that would classify
20 695 N.Y.S.2d at 126. Besides the certification provision, the SORA contains
registration and notification provisions that take effect upon release or parole of
the convict. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-d (Consol. 1999) (subsect. 2. requiring
the sentencing court to notify the offender of his duty to register, and subsect. 3.
requiring the court to make the appropriate notifications pursuant to § 168-1).
21 Id. See also text accompanying note 19.
2 120 F.3d 1263 (2nd Cir. 1997).. The three plaintiffs in this case challenged
retroactive application of the SORA. The first was convicted of first degree
attempted rape in 1990 and paroled since 1994. The second was convicted of
first degree sexual abuse in 1995 and sentenced to probation. The third was
convicted of first degree attempted sodomy in 1989 and is entitled to conditional
release. Id. at 1266 n.3.
23 Id. at 1274-75 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1997)
where involuntary commitment of "mentally abnormal" convicted sex offenders
was not considered punishment, thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double
Jeopardy Clauses).
2' Id. at 1266 (referring to the legislative history and preamble of the Act. See
text accompanying note 10).
' Id. at 1268. "The five-member Board, composed of 'experts in the field of
the behavior and treatment of sex offenders' from the Division of Parole and the
594 [Vol 16
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convicted sex offenders by severity of offense, which invoked a
higher frequency and duration of registration and three
corresponding levels of notification.'
The Pataki court found three reasons why the notification
provision of the law was non-punitive despite its inclusion in the
Corrections Law volume of the New York Statutes: (1) the scope
of notification is related to the risk of recidivism; (2) public
access to information is carefully controlled through a pay-per-use
900 telephone number;' and, (3) there are many safeguards
including criminal penalties for misuse of the information. 9 As
held by the court in Matter of M. G. v. Travis, "[t]he registration
provisions were adopted as a remedial measure to ameliorate the
danger to the public caused by the release of sex offenders, to
address recidivism and to provide law enforcement with an
investigative tool for identifying and acting upon potential
recurrence of sexual offenses by past offenders." The court
Department of Probation... is charged with the responsibility of developing
guidelines and procedures to assess the risk of re-offense and the threat posed."
Id (citing N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1).
26 Id at 1267-68. The notification was made to law enforcement agencies
and/or the public based on the potential for recidivism. Id
27 Id at 1278. The risk level of the offender is determined according to the
likelihood of recidivism, and a broader disclosure is given to the public for a
higher risk level. A risk level one causes notification to be made to the law
enforcement agency of the residence of the offender following release, and the
law enforcement agency where the offender resided at the time of his
conviction. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1 (6)(A). Risk level two permits the law
enforcement agencies to disseminate relevant information to any entity having a
vulnerable population related to the nature of the offense. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 168-1 (6)(B). A risk level three is preserved for a "sexually violent predator,"
and additionally permits relevant information to be made available to the public.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-I (6)(C).
' Id The caller must identify the individual by name, exact address, and other
required information, and the amount of information released is dependent upon
the risk level. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-p.
29 Id See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-p (3) for misuse of the 900 number, and
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-q (2) for misuse of information received through
other means, which is deemed to be a Class B misdemeanor. N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 168-u.




Gingher: People v Hernandez
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
reasoned that registration was necessary in order to implement the
notification provisions of the law.3 The public was not given
notice of registration, and the burden imposed by registering was
not severe enough to constitute punishment. When compared to
other weightier burdens upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court
"against ex post facto challenges, including deportation,
termination of financial support, and loss of livelihood,"32
registration is not punishment.
Sihice Hernandez merely established the temporal relationship of
the commission of his crime and did not make a showing that
certification was punitive in form and fact, the second part of the
Pataki determination did not need to be invoked by the Appellate
Division. The legislative intent of the SORA covers all three
provisions of the law--certification, registration and notification.
Hernandez failed to distinguish the certification provision from the
registration and notification provisions of the SORA, and how the
certification by the sentencing court of his status as a sex offender
could be considered punishment.33 The Appellate Division deemed
the certification required by the SORA non-punitive and
constitutional by reference to People v. Langdon.34 Certification of
Hemandez as a sex offender does no more than place a general
classification upon him for conviction of the specific crimes with
which he was charged. Retroactive application of the SORA
through court certification of Hernandez as a sex offender thus
withstood Hernandez's Ex Post Facto Clause challenge under both
the New York State35 and United States36 Constitutions.
Robert Gingher
31 Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1285.
32 Id.
33 695 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
3 258 A.D.2d 937, 685 N.Y.S.2d 877 (holding that the SORA may be applied
retroactively to sex offenders convicted prior to the Act's effective date without
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause). Id.
's N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing in pertinent part: "No Bill of Attainder or
ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This section provides in pertinent part: "No State
shall... pass any... ex post facto Law... ." Id.
[Vol 16596
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